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Tsongkhapa (Tibetan script: ཙོང་ཁ་པ་, , meaning: "the man from Xining" or "the Man from Onion Valley", c. 1357–1419) was an influential Tibetan people Buddhist monk, philosopher and Tantra yogi, whose activities led to the formation of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism.Tsong khapa (2006), pp. ix-x.
His philosophical works are a grand synthesis of the Buddhist epistemological tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakirti, the Cittamatra philosophy of the mind, and the madhyamaka philosophy of Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti.Tsong khapa (2006), pp. ix-xii.Sparham, Gareth, "Tsongkhapa", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Central to his philosophical and soteriological teachings is "a radical view of emptiness" which sees all phenomena as devoid of Svabhava.Newland 2009, p. 8. This view of emptiness is not a kind of nihilism or a total denial of existence. Instead, it sees phenomena as existing "interdependently, Relationalism, non-Essentialism, Conventionalism" (which Tsongkhapa terms "mere existence").Garfield, Jay (2014), “Madhyamaka is Not Nihilism”, in Jeeloo Liu and Douglas L. Berger (eds.), Nothingness in Asian Philosophy (New York: Routledge), 44-54.
Tsongkhapa emphasized the importance of philosophical reasoning in the path to liberation. According to Tsongkhapa, meditation must be paired with rigorous reasoning in order "to push the mind and precipitate a breakthrough in cognitive fluency and insight."
He is also known by Chinese as Zongkapa Lobsang Zhaba or just Zōngkābā (宗喀巴). In Mongolian, he is known as Bogd Zonkhov (Богд Зонхов).
When he was sixteen, Tsongkhapa traveled to Central Tibet (Ü-Tsang), where he studied at the scholastic institutions of the Sangphu monastery, the Drikung Kagyu and the Sakya tradition of Sakya Pandita (1182–1251).Jinpa 2019, pp. 27-32. At the Drikung Thil Monastery he studied under Chenga Chokyi Gyalpo, the great patriarch of Drikung Kagyu, and received teachings on numerous topics like Mahamudra and the Six Dharmas of Naropa.Jinpa 2019, p. 32. Tsongkhapa also studied Tibetan medicine, followed by all major Buddhist scholastic subjects including abhidharma, ethics, epistemology (Sk. Pramana), Vajrayana and various lineages of Vajrayana.
Tsongkhapa studied widely under numerous teachers from various Tibetan Buddhist traditions.Crystal Mirror VI : 1971, Dharma Publishing, page 464, 0-913546-59-3 His main teachers include: the Sakya masters Rendawa and Rinchen Dorje, the Kagyu master Chenga Rinpoche and the Jonang masters Bodong Chakleh Namgyal, Khyungpo Hlehpa and Chokyi Pelpa. Tsongkhapa also received the three main Kadampa lineages. He received the Lam-Rim lineage, the oral guideline lineage from the Nyingma Lama, Lhodrag Namka-gyeltsen, and lineage of textual transmission from Lama Umapa.
Rendawa Zhönnu Lodrö was Tsongkhapa's most important teacher.Jinpa 2019, p. 41. Under Rendawa, Tsongkhapa studied various classic works, including the Pramanavarttika, the Abhidharmakosha, the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Madhyamakavatara.Jinpa 2019, pp. 41-45. Tsongkhapa also studied with a Nyingma teacher, Drupchen Lekyi Dorje (), also known as Namkha Gyaltsen (, 1326–1401). The Life of Shabkar: The Autobiography of a Tibetan yogin by Źabs-dkar Tshogs-drug-raṅ-grol, Matthieu Ricard. State University of New York Press: 1994. pg 25[2]
During his early years, Tsongkhapa also composed a few original works, including the Golden Garland (), a commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra from the perspective of the Yogācāra-svātantrika-madhyamaka tradition of Śāntarakṣita which also attempts to refute the shentong views of Dolpopa (1292–1361).Ngawang Samten/Garfield. Ocean of Reasoning. OUP 2006, page x
During this period of extensive meditation retreat, Tsongkhapa had numerous visions of guru Mañjuśrī ( Jamyang Lama). During these visions he would receive teachings from the bodhisattva and ask questions about the right view of emptiness and Buddhist practice. An important instruction Tsongkhapa is said to have received about the view from Mañjuśrī is:
"It is inappropriate to be partial either to emptiness or to appearance. In particular, you need to take the appearance aspect seriously."Jinpa 2019, pp. 103-107.Tsongkhapa would also discuss these visions and instructions with his teacher Rendawa (and some record of this correspondence has survived). During this period, Tsongkhapa is also said to have received a series of oral transmissions from Mañjuśrī. These later came to be called the Mañjuśrī cycle of teachings.
In 1397, while in intensive meditation retreat at Wölkha Valley, Tsongkhapa writes that he had a “major insight” ( ngeshé chenpo) into the view of emptiness.Jinpa 2019, pp. 157-187 Initially, Tsongkhapa had a dream of the great madhyamaka masters: Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita, Aryadeva, and Chandrakirti. In this dream, Buddhapālita placed a wrapped text on the top of Tsongkhapa's head. After waking from this dream, Tsongkhapa began to study Buddhapālita's commentary to Nagarjuna's Middle Way Verses. As he was reading chapter 18, his understanding became crystal clear and all his doubts vanished. According to Thupten Jinpa, "at the heart of Tsongkhapa’s breakthrough experience was a profound realization of the equation of emptiness and dependent origination." He then spent the next spring and summer in deep meditation, experiencing great bliss, devotion, and gratitude to the Buddha.
Tsongkhapa also wrote other major works during this period, including Essence of Eloquence ( Legs bshad snying po), Ocean of Reasoning ( Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho, a commentary on Nagarjuna's classic Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), the Medium-Length Lamrim, and Elucidation of the Intent ( dGongs pa rab gsal), his last major writing.
the major philosophical texts composed in the remaining twenty years of his life develop with great precision and sophistication the view he developed during this long retreat period and reflect his realization that while Madhyamaka philosophy involves a relentlessly negative dialectic — a sustained critique both of reification and of nihilism and a rejection of all concepts of essence—the other side of that dialectic is an affirmation of conventional reality, of dependent origination, and of the identity of the two truths, suggesting a positive view of the nature of reality as well.
In 1409, Tsongkhapa worked on a project to renovate the Jokhang Temple, the main temple in Lhasa. He also established a 15-day prayer festival, known as the Great Prayer Festival, at Jokhang to celebrate Gautama Buddha.Jinpa 2019, pp. 237-257. In 1409, Tsongkhapa also worked to found Ganden Monastery, located 25 miles north of Lhasa.Dowman, Keith (1988). The Power-places of Central Tibet: The Pilgrim's Guide, p. 103. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; ISBN 0-7102-1370-0 Two of his students, Tashi Palden (1379–1449) and Shakya Yeshey (1354–1435) respectively founded Drepung monastery (1416), and Sera Monastery (1419). Together with Ganden, these three would later become the most influential Gelug monasteries in Tibet and also the largest monasteries in the world. These institutions became the center of a new growing school of Tibetan Buddhism, the Ganden or Gelug sect.
After Tsongkhapa's death, his disciples worked to spread his teachings and the Gelug school grew rapidly across the Tibetan Plateau, founding new or converting existing numerous monasteries. The new Gelug tradition, as a descendant of the Kadam school, emphasized monastic discipline and rigorous study of the Buddhist classics.Jamgon Mipham. Translated by Padmakara Translation Group. The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgön Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of The Way of the Bodhisattva. Boulder: Shambhala Publications, 2007, p. 30. According to Jinpa, by the end of the fifteenth century, the "new Ganden tradition had spread through the entire Tibetan Plateau, with monasteries upholding the tradition located in western Tibet, in central Ü-Tsang, and in southern Tibet, and in Kham and Amdo in the east."
After his death, Tsongkhapa's works were also published in woodblock prints, making them much more accessible. Several biographies of Tsongkhapa were also written by ordained scholars of different traditions. Tsongkhapa was also held in high regard by key figures of other Tibetan Buddhist traditions. 8th Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, in a poem called In Praise of the Incomparable Tsong Khapa, calls Tsongkhapa "the reformer of Buddha’s doctrine", "the great charioteer of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet", "supreme among those who propound emptiness", and "one who had helped spread robe-wearing monastics across Tibet and from China to Kashmir". The 9th Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje praised Tsongkhapa as one "who swept away wrong views with the correct and perfect ones".
Tsongkhapa's works and teachings became central for the Ganden or Gelug school, where he is seen as a highly revered teacher.Cozort/Preston : 2003, Buddhist Philosophy, page VIII-IX Their interpretation and exegesis became a major focus of Gelug scholasticism. They were also very influential on later Tibetan philosophers, who would either defend or criticize Tsongkhapa's views on numerous points.
Tsongkhapa's body had been preserved at Ganden Monastery. The entire compound was reduced to rubble by Chinese Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. After they failed to sink the body into a river, it was eventually burned with kerosene. Only a single tooth survived, and its clay impressions were secretly distributed to those of the Buddhist faith.Robert Beer. "The Stupa (Tib. mchod rten)". The Encyclopaedia of Tibetan Symbols and Motifs. Boston: Shambhala, 1999, pg. 128
Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka thought has become widely influential in the western scholarly understanding of Madhyamaka, as the majority of books and articles beginning in the 1980s were based on Gelug explanations.Jamgon Mipham, Padmakara Translation Group (2017). The Wisdom Chapter: Jamgön Mipham's Commentary on the Ninth Chapter of The Way of the Bodhisattva. p. 31. Shambhala Publications.
According to these myths, Tsongkhapa had been a student of Mañjuśrī for numerous past lives. In a former life, he aspired to spread Vajrayāna and the perfect view of emptiness in front of the Buddha Indraketu. Tsongkhapa then received a prophecy from numerous Buddhas which said that he would become the tathāgata Siṁhasvara (Lion's Roar). Another story recounts that during Śākyamuni's life, Tsongkhapa, in the form of a Brahmin boy, offered the Buddha a crystal rosary and generated bodhicitta. The Buddha prophesied that the boy would one day be the reviver of the Buddha's doctrine. Hagiographies such as Khedrup Je's also depict how Tsongkhapa achieved full Buddhahood after his death. Some hagiographical sources also claim that Tsongkhapa was an emanation of Mañjuśrī as well as a reincarnation of Nagarjuna, Atiśa and Padmasambhava.
Tsongkhapa is also known for his emphasis on the importance of philosophical reasoning on the path to liberation. According to Tsongkhapa, meditation must be paired with rigorous reasoning in order "to push the mind and precipitate a breakthrough in cognitive fluency and insight."
According to Thupten Jinpa, Tsongkhapa's thought was concerned with three main misinterpretations of madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet:Thupten Jinpa. Tsongkhapa's Qualms about Early Tibetan Interpretations of Madhyamaka Philosophy. Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 3-28.
According to Thupten Jinpa, one of Tsongkhapa's main concerns was "to delineate the parameters of Madhyamaka reasoning in such a way that Madhyamaka dialectics cannot be seen to negate the objects of everyday experience and, more importantly, ethics and religious activity" or as Tsongkhapa put it, one must "correctly identify the object of negation" (which is svabhava).Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, pp. 37-38. RoutledgeCurzon. Tsongkhapa held that if one did not properly understand what is to be negated in madhyamaka, one was at risk of either negating too much (nihilism) or negating too little (essentialism), and thus one would "miss the mark" of madhyamaka.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, p. 49. RoutledgeCurzon. According to Jinpa, the correct object of negation for Tsongkhapa is "our innate apprehension of self-existence" which refers to how even our normal ways of perceiving the world "are effected by a belief in some kind of intrinsic existence of things and events". Jinpa also writes that the second major aspect of Tsongkhapa's philosophical project "entails developing a systematic theory of reality in the aftermath of an absolute rejection of intrinsic existence".
Tsongkhapa saw emptiness ( shūnyatā) of intrinsic nature as a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent arising), the teaching that no dharma ("thing", "phenomena") has an existence of its own, but always comes into existence in dependence on other dharmas. According to Tsongkhapa, dependent-arising and emptiness are inseparable. Tsongkhapa's view on "ultimate reality" is condensed in the short text In Praise of Dependent Arising, Alexander Berzin, In Praise of Dependent Arising Patrick Jennings, Tsongkhapa: In Praise of Relativity; The Essence of Eloquence which states that phenomena do exist conventionally, but that, ultimately, everything is dependently arisen, and therefore void of inherent existence or intrinsic nature ( svabhava), which is "the object of negation" or that which is to be disproved by madhyamaka reasoning. Susan Kahn, The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness Tsongkhapa writes that "since objects do not exist through their own nature, they are established as existing through the force of convention."
Furthermore, according to Tsongkhapa, emptiness is itself empty of inherent existence and thus only exists nominally and conventionally as dependent arising.Newland 2009, p. 58. There is thus no "transcendental ground," and "ultimate reality" that has an existence of its own. Instead, emptiness is the negation of such a transcendental independent reality and an affirmation that all things exist interdependently (even emptiness itself).Newland 2009, p. 63. Emptiness is the ultimate truth (which applies to all possible phenomena, in all possible worlds), but it is not an ultimate phenomenon, thing or a primordial substance (which has always existed, is self-created, and is self-sustaining etc.) like Brahman. As such, the ultimate truth of emptiness for Tsongkhapa is a negational truth, a non-affirming negation. This ultimate reality is the mere absence of intrinsic nature in all things.
A non-affirming or non-implicative ( prasajya) negation is a negation which does not leave something in the place of what has been negated. For instance, when one says that a Buddhist should not drink alcohol, they are not affirming that a Buddhist should, in fact, drink something else. According to Tsongkhapa, in negating inherent nature, a madhyamika is not affirming any thing or quality in its place (such as some ultimate void, absolute, or ground of being).Lama Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning, pg. 59
In his works, Tsongkhapa takes pains to refute an alternative interpretation of emptiness which was promoted by the Tibetan philosopher Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (1292–1361). This view (called shentong, "empty of other") held that ultimate reality is not a non-affirming negation, and that it is only empty of conventional things and is not empty of itself. This view thus holds that ultimate reality has a kind of true existence as the ultimate and absolute ground of reality.Stearns, Cyrus (1999), The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen, p. 82. State University of New York Press, ISBN 0-7914-4191-1. According to Tsongkhapa, this view is absurd and is not found in the Buddhist texts.Newland 2009, p. 65.
Tsongkhapa cites numerous passages from Nagarjuna which show that emptiness (the lack of intrinsic nature) and dependent origination (the fact that all dharmas arise based on causes and conditions) ultimately have the same intent and meaning and thus they are two ways of discussing one single reality.Newland 2009, p. 32. Tsongkhapa also cites various passages from Chandrakirti to show that even though phenomena do not arise intrinsically, they do arise conventionally. Chandrakirti is quoted by Tsongkhapa as stating "even though all things are empty, from those empty things effects are definitely produced", "because things are not produced causelessly, or from causes such as a divine creator, or from themselves, or from both self and other, they are produced dependently", and "we contend that dependently produced things are, like reflections, not produced intrinsically."Newland 2009, pp. 37, 53-54.
He also cites a passage from Chandrakirti's commentary to Aryadeva Four Hundred which states:
"Our analysis focuses only on those who search for the intrinsically real referent. What we are refuting here is that things and are established by means of their own-being. We do not however negate the eyes and so on, which are causally conditioned and are dependently originated in that they are the fruits of karma."Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, p. 45. RoutledgeCurzon.In this way, Tsongkhapa argues that the madhyamaka idea that dharmas do not arise or are not found is to be qualified as meaning that they do not arise intrinsically or essentially. He also cites the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra where the Buddha says, "Mahamati, thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced".Newland 2009, p. 54.
Because of this, Tsongkhapa holds that while conventional phenomena cannot withstand ultimate analysis (which searches for the true or ultimate nature of anything and is unable to find anything intrinsically), this does not mean that conventional phenomena are invalidated, undermined or negated by this ultimate analysis, since they still exist as dependent arisings.Newland 2009, p. 40. Indeed, for Tsongkhapa, it is because things are ultimately empty that they can be said to arise and exist at all. Some Tibetan madhyamikas hold that conventional truths are merely the relative conventions of simple everyday people, but that these conventions do not exist for advanced meditators or madhyamika philosophers. Tsongkhapa rejects this as "a great philosophical error" and affirms the pragmatic importance of conventional truths.Newland 2009, p. 43. For Tsongkhapa, the rejection of the dependent reality of the conventional undermines the very possibility of truth and falsehood, and of any epistemic authority and thus, it undermines all Buddhist teachings regarding bondage and liberation as well as undermining itself as a cogent argument. However, like Candrakīrti, Tsonkghapa also accepts that while conventional truths are truths, they also can obscure or veil the ultimate (since for most people, these truths appear as intrinsically true). This is like how a mirage is a real phenomenon, but can also be deceptive (since it appears to be what it is not)
Tsongkhapa also argues that ultimate analysis is not merely a philosophical or intellectual matter, instead it is supposed to negate a deep internal habit that sentient beings have which experiences the world in a false and distorted way. This superimposition is a "pervasive sense that things are real and solid and exist just as they appear" which we have become habituated and addicted to for countless lifetimes. This addiction is what is to be refuted and abandoned. It is not the idea of "intrinsic existence" as a philosophical concept (equivalent to a non-existent rabbit's horn and thus trivial).Newland 2009, p. 44, 57. Another way of saying this is that for Tsongkhapa, the most subtle object of negation is the perception that phenomena have "their own way of existing without being posited through the force of consciousness".Newland 2009, p. 70. It is an ongoing mental process of imputing objectively independent reality and intrinsic existence to what is perceived.Newland 2009, pp. 70-71.
Tsongkhapa's view that a dependent and conventional reality is not negated by madhyamaka (and that it is just intrinsic nature that is negated) was a subject of much debate among Tibetan madhyamaka philosophers and became a subject of critique for Sakya school figures like Gorampa (1429-1489).Garfield, Jay L.; Thakchoe, Sonam. Identifying the Object of Negation and the Status of Conventional Truth: Why the dGag Bya Matters So Much to Tibetan Madhyamikas in Cowherds (2010). Sakya philosophers like Gorampa and his supporters held that madhyamaka analysis rejects all conventional phenomena (which he calls "false appearances" and sees as conceptually produced) and so, tables and persons are no more real than dreams or Santa Claus. Thus, for Gorampa (contra Tsongkhapa), conventional truth is "entirely false", "unreal", "a kind of nonexistence" and "truth only from the perspective of fools." But for Tsongkhapa, the two truths (conventional and ultimate) are two facts about the same reality, or "two aspects of one and the same world" according to Thupten Jinpa.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, p. 158. RoutledgeCurzon. Thus for Tsongkhapa, to totally negate conventional truth (at the level of ultimate truth) would be to negate dependent origination (and so, it is to negate emptiness, the ultimate truth itself). Tsongkhapa sees this as a kind of nihilism.
In order to explain how conventional reality is perceived in a valid way, Tsongkhapa draw on Buddhist pramāṇa philosophy in order to develop his own Buddhist epistemological theory. From Tsongkhapa's perspective, in order for something to exist (conventionally, since nothing exists ultimately), it must be validly designated by a non-impaired functioning consciousness. To talk about an object that does not exist in relation to a subject is incoherent.Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Understanding the Mind Pp 9 According to Tsongkhapa, something is validly designated (i.e. it exists conventionally and dependently) if it meets all of the following three conditions:Newland 2009, pp. 45-48.
Whatever fails to meet those criteria does not exist at all (like a Flat Earth), and relationships between objects cannot exist without being validly designated into existence.Newland 2009, p. 47.
Thus, according to Tsongkhapa, when Candrakīrti states that “the world is not valid in any way”, he is referring to how ordinary worldly consciousnesses are not valid sources of knowledge with regard to ultimate reality. However, Tsongkhapa argues that Candrakīrti does accept pramāṇas conventionally, since he also states "the world knows objects with four valid cognitions." As such, while Tsongkhapa reads Candrakīrti as not accepting that conventional sources of knowledge know the intrinsic nature of things (since there are none), he also argues that Candrakīrti affirms that pramāṇas can give us knowledge about conventional reality (even while our sense faculties are also deceptive, in that they also superimpose intrinsic nature).Newland 2009, pp. 49-50.
For Tsongkhapa, there are two valid ways of understanding the world, two levels of explanation: one way which understands conventional phenomena (which are real but also deceptive, like a magic trick) and another way which sees the profound ultimate truth of things, which is the sheer fact that they lack intrinsic nature. As Newland explains, each one of these epistemic points of view provides a different lens or perspective on reality, which Tsongkhapa illustrates by discussing how "we do not see sounds no matter how carefully we look." In the same way, while conventional truths are not found by an ultimate analysis that searches for their intrinsic nature, they are still functional conventionally and this is not discredited by the ultimate truth of emptiness. Tsongkhapa thinks that if we only relied on the ultimate epistemological point of view, we would not be able to distinguish between virtue from non-virtue, or enlightenment from samsara (since ultimate analysis only tells us that they are equally empty). Instead, Tsongkhapa holds that the emptiness must complement, rather than undermine, conventional Buddhist truths.
This is a different interpretation of Candrakīrti's epistemic theory than that adopted by Tibetan figures like Gorampa and Taktsang Lotsawa, who argue that Candrakīrti's prāsaṅgika mādhyamika rejects all epistemic sources of knowledge since all conventional cognitions are flawed.Thakchöe, Sonam. Prāsaṅgika Epistemology in Context in Cowherds (2010).
Tsongkhapa held that the alternative svātantrika approach to madhyamaka (defended by figures like Śāntarakṣita or Bhāviveka) was inferior. Tsongkhapa argued that the svātantrika approach holds that one had to posit autonomous ( svatantrānumāna) in order to defend madhyamaka and that this insistence implies that phenomena ( Abhidharma) or at least logic itself, has intrinsic nature ( svabhava) conventionally.Tsongkhapa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume Three); , pp 225–275 after a very lengthy and well-referenced debate, strongly relying upon Candrakirti's (a Prasaṅgika) analysis of Bhāvaviveka (a Svātantrika) in the Prasanna-padā ('Clear Words' La Vallée Poussin (1970) 28.4–29; sDe dGe Kanjur (Kanakura 1956) 3796: Ha 9a7-b3)Newland 2009, p. 82.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, pp. 63-64. RoutledgeCurzon. Bhāviveka (the main target of Tsongkhapa's critique) does not actually affirm the existence of intrinsic natures conventionally or that conventional reality is "established with its own identity," in any of his texts, and Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the implications of Bhāviveka's thought is a topic of much debate among Tibetan and modern western authors on madhyamaka.Dreyfus, Georges B.J.; McClintock, Sara (2015). Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? pp. 187-188. Simon and Schuster.
Regarding autonomous syllogistic arguments, Tsongkhapa (like Candrakirti) argues that they are not always necessary and that prāsaṅga arguments (i.e. reductios) are often enough to prove the madhyamaka view of emptiness by "demonstrating the unwelcome consequences (in any given position that presupposes intrinsic existence)."Newland 2009, p. 22. Tsongkhapa does not reject that madhyamikas can make use of autonomous syllogisms, but he disagrees with Bhāviveka's insistence that they must use them.Newland 2009, p. 80. According to Jinpa, Tsongkhapa here is critiquing what contemporary philosophy would call "the autonomy of reason", "that is, that reason, or logic, possesses its own Ontology status as an independent, ultimate reality".
For Tsongkhapa, these key differences reveal that the understanding of emptiness of the svātantrika philosophers is inferior to the Prasangika, since the svātantrika insistence on the use of autonomous syllogisms implies that they accept intrinsic nature conventionally (and since they think their syllogisms are established on this basis, they hold that their conclusions are certain).Newland 2009, p. 81. Tsongkhapa strongly rejects that either phenomenon or reasoning have intrinsic natures or characteristics in any way. Instead, Tsongkhapa holds that all phenomena are dependent and "simply labeled by thought construction" (Tib. rtog pas btags tsam) and thus they are empty of intrinsic nature even conventionally.Newland 2009, pp. 77-78. While Tsongkhapa holds that the insistence on the use of syllogisms (and the idea that they provide certainty) reveals a shortcoming in the thought of svātantrika, nevertheless, he thinks that prāsaṅgikas may make use of syllogistic arguments, as long as they do not rely on (conventional) intrinsic characteristics when making use of these syllogisms.Dreyfus, Georges B.J.; McClintock, Sara (2015). Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? pp. 259-260. Simon and Schuster.
While some Tibetan thinkers argued that Nagarjuna's refutation of existence, non-existence, both or neither (called the catuṣkoṭi, "four corners") meant that he rejected all philosophical views (and all existence) completely, Tsongkhapa disagrees with this interpretation. Instead, Tsongkhapa understands Nagarjuna's negation of the catuṣkoṭi to refer to the lack of intrinsic existence, intrinsic non-existence etc. Thus, as Guy Newland explains, Tsongkhapa interprets the negation of the catuṣkoṭi to mean that "we refute the reifying view that things exist ultimately; we refute the nihilistic view that things do not exist even conventionally; we refute that there is any single sense in which things both exist and do not exist; we refute that there is any single sense in which things neither exist nor do not exist."Newland 2009, p. 61. As Thupten Jinpa notes, this interpretation of the negative catuṣkoṭi is based on Tsongkhapa's view that the Sanskrit term bhāva (existence) has a dual meaning in madhyamaka: one refers to a reified sense of intrinsic existence (which is to be negated) and a conventionally existent actuality, functional thing or event (which is not negated).Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, p. 40. RoutledgeCurzon. Jinpa notes that Tsongkhapa interprets the madhyamaka argument called 'diamond splinters' ( rdo rje gzegs ma), which refutes the intrinsic arising of dharmas, in a similar manner.
This is also why Tsongkhapa holds that reasoning about means of knowledge or epistemological tools (Skt. Pramana) is central to the madhyamaka project, since he thinks that prāsaṅgika-madhyamikas make use of reasoning in order to establish their view of the lack of intrinsic nature conventionally. However, this reasoning derives its efficacy through dependent origination, not through some intrinsic nature or power (whether conventional or otherwise).
According to Tsongkhapa and Gyaltsap, three of these main ideas relate to ontology and are:
One final point concerns the result or fruit (of the path) i.e. Buddhahood. For Tsongkhapa, fully awakened Buddhas do perceive all of conventional reality in their fullest extent (even impure things).
Regarding the storehouse consciousness ( ālāyavijñāna), Tsongkhapa holds that this theory is rejected by the ultimate view of prāsaṅgika madhyamaka. However, he agrees that this teaching may be of provisional use for some individuals (since it was taught by the Buddha in some sutras) who hold to a lower view, are not able to fully understand emptiness and have a "fear of annihilation".Cozort, Daniel (1998). Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School, p. 436, Snow Lion Publications.Cozort, Daniel. "Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School" Pg 236-7 Tsongkhapa relies on Chandrakirti's refutation of the storehouse consciousness, particularly in Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 39.
Tsongkhapa also presents an alternative view of explaining personal identity, rebirth and karma. These are explained through a "mere I" ( nga tsam) that is dependently designated on the basis of the five aggregates.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, pp. 109-110. RoutledgeCurzon. Tsongkhapa states that "we should maintain that the object of our innate I-consciousness is the mere person – i.e., the mere I - which is the focus of our natural sense of self".Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, p. 117. RoutledgeCurzon. This conventional and dependent sense of self or I-consciousness is a pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual instinctive process.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, pp. 119-125. RoutledgeCurzon. When rebirth occurs, an individual's mental continuum ( rgyun) moves from one life to another, just like a river or stream moves along. The continuum's "mere I" carries the past life karmic imprints to the next life and there is thus no need to posit a separate kind of "storehouse" consciousness for karmic imprints.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, pp. 135-138. RoutledgeCurzon.
Tsongkhapa also rejects Buddhist idealism (which was associated with the Yogachara school and various Tibetan madhyamaka authors) and thus affirms the conventional existence of an external world (like Bhaviveka).Newland 2009, p. 22 As Newland writes, Tsongkhapa's madhyamaka "does assert that there is a fully functioning external world, a world that exists outside of our minds. However, in the same breath it emphasizes that this external world is utterly dependent upon consciousness."Newland 2009, p. 74. In his rejection of Yogācāra idealism, Tsongkhapa follows Chandrakirti's refutation of Yogacara in the Madhyamakāvatāra.Hayes, Richard (2019), " Madhyamaka", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Because of this, for Tsongkhapa, all statements and passages in the various sutras or treatises which do not express this lack of intrinsic nature are not definitive or ultimate statements (Skt. nitartha) and are thus statements which "require further interpretation" or "need to be fully drawn out" ( neyartha). This includes all texts belonging to the Śrāvaka schools, all Yogachara works as well as non-prāsaṅgika madhyamaka philosophy (like Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita). This also includes all sutras and statements regarding the important concept of tathāgatagarbha (i.e. Buddha-nature) or the luminous mind, which for Tsongkhapa, are just an expedient way of describing the emptiness of the mind and its defilements, as well as the potential for Buddhahood which all beings have.Thupten Jinpa (2002). Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way, pp. 139-140. RoutledgeCurzon. In this he follows Indian madhyamikas like Bhaviveka and Chandrakirti as well as Kadam scholars such as Ngog Loden Sherab and Chaba Chokyi Senge.Brunnhölzl, Karl (2014). When the Clouds Part, The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sutra and Tantra, pp. 55, 66. Boston & London: Snow Lion.
For Tsongkhapa, only the madhyamaka view of Nagarjuna (as understood by prāsaṅgikas like Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Candrakīrti and Shantideva) is a definitive interpretation of the final intent of the Buddha. However, because of the Buddha's bodhicitta, he explains the teaching in a wide variety of ( neyartha) ways, all of which are ultimately based in and lead to the final insight into emptiness.
According to Jinpa, Taktsang's critique focuses on "Tsongkhapa's insistence on the need to maintain a robust notion of conventional truth grounded in some verifiable criteria of validity". For Taktsang, epistemology is faulty and thus Tsongkhapa's attempt at a synthesis of madhyamaka and pramana leads to serious problems.Jinpa 2019, pp. 329-365. Gorampa meanwhile argued that Tsongkhapa's definition of emptiness as an absolute negation of intrinsic existence was a form of nihilism. He also took issue with Tsongkhapa's characterization of conventional truth as a kind of existence.
Later Kagyu figures also penned critiques of some of Tsongkhapa's views, such as Mikyö Dorje. Gelug scholars like Lekpa Chöjor (a.k.a. Jamyang Galo, 1429–1503), the first Panchen Lama, Lozang Chökyi Gyaltsen (1507–1662), Jetsun Chökyi Gyaltsen (1469–1544/46), Sera Jetsun Chökyi Gyaltsen, Panchen Delek Nyima and Jamyang Zhepa (1648–1751) penned various responses to these various critiques in defense of Tsongkhapa's views.
The most popular source for Tsongkhapa's teachings on the Mahayana sutra path is his Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment ( Lamrim Chenmo).Tsong Khapa (2014) Volume 1, Introduction. He also wrote a Middle Length Lamrim Treatise and a Small Lamrim Treatise. Tsongkhapa's presentation generally follows the classic Kadam Lamrim system, which is divided into three main scopes or motivations (modest, medium and higher i.e. Mahayana).
Tsongkhapa's presentation of the Mahayana bodhisattva path focuses on the six perfections. Regarding the Prajnaparamita ( prajñāpāramitā), Tsongkhapa emphasizes the importance of reasoning, analytical investigation as well as the close study and contemplation of the Buddhist texts.Newland 2009, pp. 10-14 Indeed, according to Tsongkhapa, the broad study of the Buddhist texts is the “sacred life force of the path,” which is a necessary complement to the practice of meditation.Newland 2009, p. 14
In his Lamrim works, Tsongkhapa presents a unique way of mediation for the development of insight (Skt. vipaśyanā, Tib. lhag mthong). As Newland explains, for Tsongkhapa, the root of suffering and samsara is an "innate tendency to hold a distorted, reifying view of ourselves" (as well as of other phenomena). To develop the wisdom to see through this habit requires using reasoned analysis or analytical investigation ( so sor rtog pa) to arrive at the right view of emptiness (the lack of intrinsic nature). Establishing the correct view of emptiness initially requires us to 'identify the object of negation', which according to Tsongkhapa (quoting Chandrakirti) is "a consciousness that superimposes an essence of things".Newland 2009, pp. 23-24. If we do not do this correctly, we may end up either negating too much (which could lead nihilism, with negative consequences for our ethics) or negating too little (and thus leaving some subtle sense of reification untouched).Newland 2009, p. 29. Thus, for Tsongkhapa, we first need to properly identify and understand our own inner sense of reification. It is only after we have identified this in ourselves that we can refute and eliminate this error through introspective analysis, contemplation and meditation.Newland 2009, p. 17.
At the same time, we also must avoid the trap of a nihilistic view that invalidates the dependently arisen nature of things (i.e. mere existence or seeming reality) and confuses the lack of intrinsic nature with totally negating the existence of a relative and conventional self. This is because, for Tsongkhapa, the "I" or self is accepted as nominally existing in a dependent and conventional way, while the object to be negated is the inner fiction of intrinsic nature which is "erroneously reified" by our cognition. Tsongkhapa explains this mistaken inner reification which is to be negated as "a natural belief a, which leads us to perceive things and events as possessing some kind of intrinsic existence and identity".
The process of refuting the intrinsic existence of the self is described in chapter 23 of Lamrim Chenmo vol. 3, and entails four steps:
According to Tsongkhapa, Buddhist essentialists (like Vaibhasikas) and non-Buddhist essentialists (Atman-Brahman) are not negating the correct object, but are only negating "imaginary constructs" and "acquired ignorance" and thus they only realize a coarse selflessness which only suppresses, but not removes, the obstructions to nirvana from samsara. According to Tsongkhapa, only a negation which undercuts the innate perception of an inherently existing self is truly liberating.
Tsongkhapa rejects the idea that meditation is only about throwing away all concepts, instead, we need to gradually refine our understanding until it becomes non-conceptual wisdom. While Tsongkhapa emphasizes the importance of attaining the correct conceptual understanding of emptiness through this analytical contemplation, he also understands that this knowledge is not the actual realization of emptiness itself (which is non-conceptual and non-dualistic). As such, according to Tsongkhapa, after one has attained the correct conceptual understanding of emptiness, this insight needs to be refined through repeated calming meditation practice (and the samadhi which it produces) and continued familiarization with insight meditation. Over time, one's insight is transformed into a nondualistic and non-conceptual experience of emptiness.
For Tsongkhapa, Buddhist tantra is based on the same madhyamaka view of emptiness as sutra (non-tantric) Mahāyāna and that they both also share the same goal (Buddhahood).Tsongkhapa, The Dalai Lama, Hopkins, Jeffrey (2016), pp. 189-190. As such, Tsongkhapa sees Secret Mantra as being a subset of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and thus it also requires bodhicitta and insight into emptiness (through vipaśyanā meditation) as a foundation. Secret Mantra is only differentiated from sutra by its special method, the esoteric practice of deity yoga (Tib. lha'i rnal 'byor), which is a much faster method than the practice of the six perfections alone.Tsongkhapa, The Dalai Lama, Hopkins, Jeffrey (2016), pp. viii, 189-194. Tsongkhapa also argues that complete Buddhahood can ultimately only be attained through the practice of Highest Yoga Tantra (while the lower practices of the perfections and the other tantras aid one in advancing on the path). However, Tsongkhapa also holds that non-tantric Mahāyāna practices are indispensable the practice of Secret Mantra and that bodhicitta is the basis for the practice of both sutra Mahāyāna and Secret Mantra.Tsongkhapa, The Dalai Lama, Hopkins, Jeffrey (2016), pp. 189-194, 211-215.
Thus, for Tsongkhapa, the sutra bodhisattva path (and its three principal aspects of renunciation, bodhicitta and insight into emptiness) must precede the practice of Secret Mantra.Arnold, Edward A. (2021). Tsongkhapa’s Coordination of Sūtra and Tantra: Ascetic Performance, Narrative, and Philosophy in the Creation of the Tibetan Buddhist Self,. p. 286. Doctoral Thesis, Columbia University. Indeed, according to Tsongkhapa, without having ascertained emptiness, one cannot practice the tantric yogas of Vajrayana. As Tsongkhapa states in A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages:
for those who enter the Vajra Vehicle, it is necessary to search for an understanding of the view that has insight into the no-self emptiness and then to meditate upon its significance in order to abandon holding to reality, the root of samsara.Tsongkhapa (translated by Gavin Kilty) (2012), A Lamp to Illuminate the Five Stages: Teachings on Guhyasamaja Tantra, pp. 98. Simon and Schuster
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